Agenda for future multilateral trade negotiations: traditional and new issues by Mathur, Somesh K
 1 
 
Agenda For Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
Traditional and New Issues1 
                                               Somesh K.Mathur2 
 
Introduction: 
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) was signed at the Geneva conference 
in 1947.It came into effect on 1 January 1948.After nearly five decades of its existence, 
GATT made way to the formation of the World Trade Organization(WTO) on January 
1,1995.GATT was a multilateral trade agreement that set rules of conduct for 
international trade relations and provided a forum for multilateral negotiations regarding 
the solution of trade problems and the gradual elimination of tariffs and other non tariff 
barriers of trade. The agreement was based largely upon principles of non-discrimination 
and reciprocity so as to liberalize trade. With the exception of Custom Unions and Free 
Trade Areas (FTAs),all contracting parties were generally bound by the agreement's Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN)Clause. Protection  were to be given to domestic industries 
through custom tariffs, thereby prohibiting import quotas and other restrictive trade 
practices. The agreement also provided for the binding of the tariff levels negotiated 
among member countries and established a framework for the settlement of grievances 
put forward by members who argued that their rights, under the terms of agreement, had 
been violated or compromised by other members trade practices. Eight rounds of trade 
negotiations were held under the aegis of GATT, the last being the most ambitious one 
i.e., the Uruguay Round (UR).UR negotiations was concerned both with  old issues such 
as unfinished business of previous GATT rounds and with grievances accumulated over 
the years and new issues such as trade in services, the protection of intellectual property 
rights, trade in agriculture and trade related investment measures. 
          Until the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, the developing 
countries were generally observers.They benefited as "free riders" from whatever 
reductions in trade barriers were negotiated among developed countries,while 
simultaneously they argued for,and to some degree received,special and differential 
treatment(S&D),both through the Generalized System of Preferences(GSP) and through 
the automaticity with which  the balance of payments exception was used to permit them 
to continue reliance upon quantitative restrictions. 
     All that changed with the conclusion of the eight and the most ambitious multilateral 
trade negotiation -the Uruguay Round on April 15,1994. By that time many policy 
makers and development economists had become convinced that the highly protectionist 
policies followed by developing countries in the name of import substitution were 
inimical to sustained economic growth,and the outer oriented policies and integration 
with the international economy offered a better hope for rapid development. Sachs and 
Warner(1995) extensive study has shown that trade boosts economic growth. It is argued 
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that developing countries achieved some considerable gains by participating in the 
round3. 
   As per the final act of the Uruguay round,the World Trade Negotiation (WTO) was 
established on January 1,1995.The WTO builds upon the organizational structure that 
existed under the GATT auspices as of early 1990s.The basic underlying philosophy of 
the WTO is that open markets,non-discrimination,and global competition in international 
trade are conducive to the national welfare of all the participating countries.In the 
WTO,the principle of non-discrimination takes two forms:Most Favored Nation(MFN) 
treatment and National Treatment(NT).MFN assures that there is nondiscrimination 
among foreign suppliers,while NT assures that there is nondiscrimination between 
foreign suppliers and domestic suppliers.The institutional structure of the WTO contains 
three components,the revised GATT,the General Agreement on Services(GATS),and the 
Agreement on trade-related intellectual property issues(TRIPs). 
  The first WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore in December 1996.The 
Second Ministerial Conference, held in Geneva in May 1998,carried forward the results 
of the Singapore Ministerial meeting and established the work programme to examine 
trade -related issues involving global electronic commerce. Attention was paid to 
preparations for the negotiations mandated under the Uruguay Round built -in 
agenda.There was an ongoing interaction among the WTO members as follow-up of the 
two ministerial meetings and for the preparation for the Third Ministerial Conference to 
be held in Seattle from November 30 to December 3,1999.This conference was expected 
to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to begin in 2000(millennium 
round).This new round was to be devoted to items on the Uruguay built in agenda 
together with new issues to be decided upon. 
The Third Ministerial Conference ended in failures with the members of the WTO not 
being able to agree on an agenda for Millennium Round. There was number of reasons 
for the failure of the Seattle Ministerial to launch a new round. Domestic  US politics 
played a key role.There was strong differences between the EU and the US on the issues 
relating to agricultural liberalization. Developing countries were unwilling to accept 
inclusion of labour standards and environmental issues within the purview of the new 
round. 
The collapse of talks at Seattle is both sobering and heartening in their lessons for 
developing countries. Sobering because the threats are arising to the multilateral trading 
system not only in the form of proliferation of preferential trading arrangements but also 
with member countries resorting to anti-dumping measures and other forms of implicit 
protection not covered under WTO rule. Krueger(1999) notes that the postponement of a 
new round may lead to (a ) sectoral liberalization  which is a trend that bodes poorly for 
future multilateral liberalization and (b) in the absence of new round, small developing 
countries are left to their own(very weak) bargaining positions whereas a new round 
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would enable them to cooperate and gain bargaining strength.Mattoo and Subramanian 
(2000) agree and note that" The hardening of partner country attitudes toward opening 
their own markets and the emergence of insidious forms of protectionism will make the 
bargaining climate less favorable for India in future" .Equally, however ,Seattle Round 
demonstrates the ability of  developing countries to resist successfully these protectionist 
demands while claiming the high ground and retaining legitimacy. 
   Clearly, there are flaws in the structure of the multilateral system as well as limits to 
what it can deliver, an observation reinforced by the events in Seattle.But Seattle should 
not deflect attention from developing countries pressing need to reform domestically and 
to engage multilaterally. Multilateral engagement should be measured but broadly active 
and supportive, rather than defensive. 
The next Ministerial level multilateral trade round is scheduled to be held in Doha,Qatar 
in November,2001. 
This paper will discuss the new and old provisions of the GATT and the WTO.Further it 
will examine the importance of such provisions and suggest ways and means for making 
them more relevant and beneficial for all members of the WTO.The paper is organized in 
the following manner.Section I will deal with the new issues.Section II will discuss the 
traditional issues and the concerns of the developing countries.The last section will give 
conclusions. 
Section I:New Issues 
The  Agenda for the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN), being discussed before the scheduled WTO Ministerial meeting at Doha,Qatar in 
November,2001 is designed to address  key issues defined by the 
 the Uruguay Round ,Singapore and Seattle Ministerial level rounds.  
· At the Uruguay Round MTN a variety of “new issues”,were discussed 
including services (GATS) and intellectual property protection (IPP), and one 
old but dormant and therefore de facto new issue: agriculture. 
· There were several factors that propelled countries to the expanded agenda. 
Among them: 
(a) Partly, it was felt that this would facilitate yet more of the “balanced 
bargains” across countries that ease the process of negotiations and 
reaching of final agreement. 
(b) Partly, it also reflected the fact that, as indicated by Lester Thurow’s 
much-cited declaration that “GATT is Dead”, and its flip side that 
Regionalism was in, the general sentiment was that GATT, in order to 
survive, would have to include agendas that the regional preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) were offering the interested lobbies: namely, 
IPP and service liberalization in NAFTA. 
(c) Partly, there was also the sentiment that the GATT should be turned 
into an institution that embraces several issues that allegedly interface 
with trade today. 
· Also the countries kept reducing border trade barriers and immeasurably 
Strengthened the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. 
The key question before the Doha Round or any future multilateral trade talks then must 
be: do we need to keep widening the agenda yet further for the same or other reasons? Or 
should we settle for a more narrowly focused MTN Round? 
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The three arguments set out above are not necessarily compelling today: 
· It is arguable that there are already enough issues (including reform of the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism) now on the table, and enough trade barriers 
still to dismantle especially after the tariffication of agricultural barriers in 
the Uruguay Round. 
· The threat from Regionalism (or PTAs) is decreasing, partly 
because there is Regionalism-fatigue and Regionalism-alarm as increasing 
numbers of impartial observers recognize how much the world trading system 
has been badly mauled by the large and increasing numbers of such PTAs that 
now afflict the scene, creating the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon as called by Jagdish 
Bhagwati, of worldwide discrimination in trade; and partly because the 
GATT died but only to become the WTO and few doubt that Geneva is where 
the real action on trade liberalization should be. 
· Increasingly, there are also questions as to the appropriateness of some of the 
new issues being proposed for future multilateral trading rounds, e.g. Linkage of Trade 
Access to environmental and labor standards (e.g. through a Social Clause), with 
questions being raised pointedly as to the criteria by which such so-called 
“trade-related” issues are to be included in the WTO which ought to be 
essentially a trade institution. 
The New Issues 
To throw light on this key question, it is important to examine the new issues that 
have been discussed,not substantially,however,among policy makers,NGOs and 
academicians at the various multilateral trading rounds.  
Five  main items have emerged in the policy arena as the most compelling: 
1.Linkage between Trade and Environment and Labor Standards; 
2.Competition Policy and  Services Standards ;  
3.Multilateral Agreement on Investment; 
4.Electronic Commerce; and 
5.Government Procurement 
 
At the outset, we must remember that, after the Uruguay Round and the launch of the 
WTO, the WTO has become what might be called a Single Undertaking in the precise 
sense that any agreement on these new issues would become binding on all 
signatories, unlike the Tokyo Round Codes which allowed GATT members to opt out 
and the three exceptions (among them, Procurement) included in the Annex to the 
Marrakesh accords setting up the WTO. So, we are talking about reaching agreements on 
questions such as the Social Clause (under Linkage) which would be mandatory on all 
members. This makes the question of the adoption of such new issues a matter of far 
greater significance, of course, than if these desired inclusions were to be left totally 
optional. 
1.Linkage versus “Appropriate Governance” 
The question of making the satisfaction of certain environmental and labor standards a 
precondition for market access has also become an issue ever since the United States 
insisted on reference to labour standards at the Uruguay Round accord and subsequently 
has attempted to get other nations to agree to include the Social Clause into the WTO at 
every opportunity, including the latest APEC meeting in Auckland, New Zealand. 
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 A range of opinions on the subject , including prominent NGOs from 
both the developed and the developing countries were invited. 
Surprisingly, except for a couple of dissenting opinions, the consensus seemed to be 
against Linkage. Instead, the sentiment seemed to shift to what  have been called 
“Appropriate Governance”, i.e. pursuing the social agendas such as raising environmental 
and labor standards in other, appropriate agencies such as ILO, UNICEF, UNEP et.al. 
Martin Khor(1999)  raises  the question: by what criteria are these added issues 
like linkage to be grafted on to WTO? Is the criterion simply to be the gratification of 
lobbies and groups in the developed countries to force their issues on to the WTO so that 
trade sanctions on behalf of their causes be legitimated? Or is the criterion to be that of 
mutual gain to all members, as trade liberalization more or less promises when trade is 
non-coercive? In this context, the inappropriateness of intellectual property protection 
(IPP) as a “new issue” at the WTO was emphasized by some of the participants: this is 
primarily a redistributive measure, put into the WTO to placate corporate lobbies in the 
rich countries, and does not properly belong to the WTO. Nor does Linkage. 
Nonetheless, Charnowitz(1999) note that leaving out linkage, one still needs to address 
the “necessary interface” between environment and trade, as in the compatibility of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements(MEAs) with WTO rules, and issues such as 
those raised by unilateral actions in Shrimp-Turtle and Dolphin-Tuna type cases. [Of 
course, no such necessary interface could be established for labor standards, but for 
certain environmental issues.] The question of filing of friends-of-the court briefs by 
environmental groups in dispute settlement cases at the WTO was also a matter that could 
be negotiated:  
This issue has been of greatest concern to all developing countries.Some 
standards,endorsed by ILO,have already been embedded in WTO-i.e., the injunction 
against the use of prison labor.And, when there is universal agreement among countries 
that certain practices are abhorrent, an international agreement through the ILO can 
surely be reached i.e., most of the countries have viewed that labor standards should be 
addressed in the ILO.Within the ILO,however,difficult negotiations led to agreement,at 
the organization's annual conference in June 1998,on a "declaration of fundamental 
workers right" which in its trade aspects essentially says much the same as the Singapore 
declaration of a commitment to core labor standards.It is suggested that WTO and ILO 
can develop core labor standards that essentially respects not only workers rights but 
human rights everywhere.Concrete actions may be taken by ILO,however.   
   Questions arise regarding both the standards to be included and the linking of those 
standards to trade issues. The question of standards is perhaps more important in the case 
of labor issues,while the linkages are probably more questionable in the case of 
environmental concerns.   
   Labor standards can be legitimately raised on humanitarian concerns by well meaning 
individuals appalled at low wages and poor working conditions in low income countries 
and by union representatives and producer/employers in industries that use relatively 
large amounts of unskilled labor in developed countries.However, to insist upon wages 
and working conditions that are above those that can result in full employment in 
developing countries is to deny a significant portion of their comparative advantage.  
There is an element of protectionist content by choking developing countries comparative 
advantage in labor intensive industries. 
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There is a general agreement on the following labor standards by all including developing 
countries to prohibit  forced slave labour, minimize hazardous or unsafe working 
conditions, agree to remove or reduce incidence of child labor in poor countries with 
certain conditions and adopt freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. 
It would be indeed churlish to dismiss out of hand the humanitarian concern of the 
citizens of rich countries with high labor standards about poor conditions of work or 
employment of children in developing countries. However, contrary to the belief among 
proponents of linking trade policies and labor standards,it is not necessarily  the case that 
such a concern is best dealt with through linkage.First,it is not inconceivable that a 
country threatened with trade sanctions for failure to raise its labor standards would not 
respond by raising them but instead choose to forego gains from trade.Second,instead of 
relying on the indirect means through linkage,which depends on the desired response by 
the developing countries for its success,the citizens of developed countries could adopt a 
more effective  direct means of pressurizing their own governments to lift any restrictions 
on the immigration of workers from countries with poor labor standards.If they chose to 
migrate,such workers would enjoy the higher labor standards prevailing in the country of 
immigration.Indeed,there is support for lifting such restrictions on moral-philosophical 
grounds as in the writing of Rawls,J(1933).He views freedom of movement and freedom 
of choice of occupation as essential primary goods equivalent to other basic rights and 
liberties,the entitlement to which is not open to political debate and allocation through the 
political process.Even lifting immigration restrictions is deemed unfeasible 
politically,citizens of rich countries could make income transfers to workers in poor 
countries.With higher incomes,it is reasonable to presume that the supply price(broadly 
defined to include labor standards) of their labour would rise,and to restore labor market 
equilibrium,labor standards would have to rise.Indeed a testof the depth of their 
humanitarian concern is the price that citizens are willing to pay for translating the 
concern into actual increase in welfare of workers in poor countries.In fact,without 
transfers,imposing higher labor standards than a less developed economy can sustain 
could mean lower employment and welfare levels for its citizens. The willingness to 
make needed income transfers is a demonstration of the willingness to pay the price. An 
alternative to income transfers other than linkage concerns the actions of citizens of 
developed countries in their markets for imported products. By not buying products of a 
firm or a country that does not observe what consumers view as acceptable labor 
standards,they can send a clear and effective signal to that firm or country to force it to 
choose between observing standards and  retaining the market or losing the market 
altogether4.If it chooses to retain the market by observing acceptable labor standards,to 
the extent the cost of import goes up because of such observance,both the exporting 
industry and buyers of imports share the cost of improving labor standards.If it chooses to 
forego the market,then although workers in the exporting industry do not gain welfare 
through higher standards,there is penalty to the firm in the form of lost exports.If the 
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citizens of the developed countries are interested only in raising the welfare of the 
workers and not in penalizing the exporting firm,they will have to compensate the firm or 
make income transfers to workers.The basic point is that there is a real cost to raising 
labor standards,and this cost has to be incurred if the intended benefit is to come about. 
As far as child labor is concerned there are many ways of creating such conditions for 
example, trying to improve the wages and productivity of adult workers so that they do 
not have to send the children out to contribute to family income. In this context once 
again citizens of developed countries concerned with the welfare of such working people 
in developing countries could influence the choice of parents away from putting their 
children to work altogether or atleast reduce the amount of work done by their children 
through income transfers to parents. There is no need to link trade with enforcing labor 
standards. The domestic challenge would be for example, governments can try to make 
existing schools more attractive for the children-to make schools better and more 
accessible to them through better transport,provision of meals in schools as well as more 
scholarships.Also there is a possibility of paying a subsidy to the mother conditional on 
her child's school attendance.In India the number of children working is quite large,but 
the number of children who are neither working nor going to school is many times larger 
than the children who are working.Most of such children are girls who are looking after 
siblings.An obvious solution would be to think of starting good number of day care 
centres.In case the child labor is banned altogether and there an increase in prices of the 
products developing countries can ask for funds to earmark for improving schools and for 
better and more schools for child workers from poor families.Most child labor in poor 
countries is in the non-trade sector.For example,in India only about 5% of child labor is 
in the export sector.WTO sanctions which are being pressed by many developed 
countries,will push these children into the non-traded sectors where the sanctions do not 
apply,and that their conditions may be worse.One needs coordination among business 
units,government,NGOs and international agencies so that no company employs child 
labor and no one is able to  undercut other companies when the price increases as a result 
of the agreement.As discussed earlier the proceeds can go for betterment of school 
facilities and infrastructure for displaced child labour..ILO can play a constructive role in 
this by providing some leadership in bringing the parties together. 
   Another view which is being made is that transnational companies are attracted to 
countries just for their poor labour standards.There is very little systematic evidence for 
that.Multinationals go to poor countries not primarily because of poor labour standards.In 
fact,labour standards in the multinational companies,by and large,are somewhat better 
than in the domestically run factories.It does not mean that the working conditions are 
good.They are dismal in many factories,domestic or foreign.It require coordination 
between governments,NGOs , business  and  making labour union effective in improving 
the working conditions. 
    
   Labor standards may be introduced in such a way that developed countries can impose 
protection against imports from developing countries5and that reasonable harmless 
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the country was violating standards. 
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standards will initially be set6.But that over the years,labor unions and others will succeed 
in having these standards elevated until they finally achieve the protectionist content that 
impairs developing countries comparative advantage in labor intensive industries. 
Certainly developing countries should be alert to the danger that,once any standards are 
accepted,the barriers against using them for protectionist purposes are greatly 
weakened.Developing countries should strongly resist labor standard as a topic for 
inclusion in the new round of negotiations. 
   Environmental standards raise some other issues.First of all,when the only 
environmental damage is borne by residents of a country,there is no obvious case for 
international standards of any kind to be applied.When there are "spillovers",the question 
becomes one of allocating "pollution" rights among countries.Most economists agree 
that,when there is a serious case for restriction of particular pollutants,such as CFC's,on a 
global basis the appropriate policy response is to allocate pollution "rights" or 
permits,and then to permit trade in those permits. 
   The key issue for reaching accords is the basis on which permits will be allocated.On 
one hand,developed countries generally are currently generating a large fraction of the 
pollutants;if rights were allocated  in proportion to existing pollution rates,developed 
countries would receive most of the permits.On the other hand,if rapid growth for 
developing countries is in prospect for next several decades,it is clear that their share of 
the increase in pollutants would be very large in the absence of environmental 
restraints.Moreover,environmental restraint would entail some brake on growth rates that 
would otherwise be attainable.For these reasons,developing countries tend to advocate 
the allocation of pollution permits,or rights,in proportion to population,while developed 
countries advocate allocation on the basis of existing shares in pollutant-generation. 
   The disagreement is fundamental, and until it is resolved,it is difficult to expect 
significant progress. Bhagwati and Srinivasan(1996) argue that a first-best solution is to 
have taxes and subsidies that reflect the externalities of various activities imposed on 
those undertaking them, combined with free trade.Since,it is seldom,if ever,that trade 
itself generates the externality,the appropriate policy measure is to impose the tax on the 
activity that generates the externality,presumably production in most cases.In case the 
offending country fails to do so then it may make sense to have 'second best solution' by 
imposing trade restraints on exports from the offending country.The chief questions 
concerning trade policy when global pollution problems such as ozone layer depletion 
and global warming are involved  instead take different turn related to cooperative 
solution oriented multilateral treaties that are sought to address them.They are however 
essentially tied into non-compliance(defection) by members and 'free riders' by 
nonmembers. 
            There are several set of interrelated issues that have formed the basis of the debate 
so far,and the positions on these issues vary among both among developed and 
developing countries.An outline of the issues is attempted here. 
1.The relationship between trade provisions of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements(MEA) and the WTO.This includes question such as,which MEAs to 
include;what to do in case the measures are incompatible with the WTO;what to do 
                                                
6 The labor standard code associated with the Mexican accession to NAFTA  is relatively innocous.It is being attacked 
in the U.S as being much too weak,and there are pressure groups attempting to raise it.Meanwhile,however,groups 
interested in achieving labor standards within the WTO are arguing that NAFTA set a good example. 
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regarding countries which are not members of a particular MEA;and which dispute 
settlement to use.Most developed countries want prior assurance that action taken under 
the terms of an MEA cannot be challenged in the WTO.The EU,in particular,proposes 
that such action should be recognized as covered by GATT Article XX(b),which allows 
measures "necessary to protect human,animal or plant life or health",provided they are 
not used to discriminate unfairly between countries or as a disguised restriction on 
trade.Developing countries in general wish to retain some possibility of WTO challenge 
of actions taken under an MEA.They are not fully reassured by evidence that most MEAs 
do not have trade provisions,or that no WTO disputes have yet arisen over actions under 
an MEA.The discussion has also included how improved WTO disciplines might help to 
further environmental objectives.Agricultural exporters such as Argentina and New 
Zealand point,for example,to the role of subsidies in encouraging pollution through 
excessive use of chemicals on crops,as well as in depletion of fish stocks through 
overfishing. 
2.Whether the WTO members need to adopt comparable process and production methods 
(PPMs) in their respective countries and if yes and how to take into account these as they 
relate in the framing of trade rules;and in this connection what weight to put on 
multilateral agreements(for example on ozone depleting substances) or unilateral 
judgemments,such as those used by US in the tuna-dolphin7 or the precautionary 
principle used by EC concerning import of meat and meat products derived from cattle to 
which either the natural hormones:oestradiol-17B,progresterone,or the synthetic 
hormones:trebolone acetate,zeranol or melengestrol(MGA),had been administered for 
growth promotion purposes(for details see Hammonds 1990,Meng,1990).In the same 
context,what to do of eco-labelling schemes,which could adversely effect imports from 
specific developing countries,and how to bring them in conformity with broader WTO 
rules on standards.As regards standards-related environmental measures,a central 
problem,in the view of many developing countries,is that in many cases these aim to 
enforce requirement that do not  concern the product itself,but rather the way in which it 
is produced,this being seen as an unacceptable effort to extend the jurisdiction of the 
country applying the measure beyond its borders. 
3.The general relationship between trade,environment and development.This has many 
facets,including the formal recognition that poverty is  a major cause of environmental 
degradation;provision of assistance to developing countries to promote sustainable 
development;issues related to the impact of new environmentally motivated standards 
imposed by developed countries on the competitiveness of developing countries exports 
and the broad relationship of different trade liberalization measures and the environment 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan,1996).  
            Developing countries face the following dilemma:should they negotiate an 
agreement covering the various complex trade and environment issues,which would 
involve legitimizing through explicit detailed understanding different market access 
restraints on environmental grounds,but would limit the more blatant unilateral developed 
country abuses;or should they leave the system as it is,when developed countries can use 
the broad language of GATT Article XX b to restrain trade on environmental 
grounds(recently interpreted very broadly),and rely on the WTO Dispute Settlement 
                                                
7 In the early 1990s Mexico complained against the United States concerning the US ban on imports of tuna caught by 
fishing methods which endangered dolphins. 
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Mechanism to curb developed country abuses? Various developing countries would 
respond to this dilemma differently. 
         The risks resulting from failure to reach environmental accords are that 
environmentalist in developed countries will lend their support to protectionist 
measure.In the wake of this development the developing countries may like to negotiate 
agreements that are less close to proportionate-to-population allocation than would,from 
their viewpoint,be ideal since,as a by-product, protectionist measures against them would 
be somewhat reduced. This point is further explained.Given the strong pressure that both 
the EU and the US would bring to bear on including this issue and the difficulties 
developing countries may have faced in using the DSM,they may wish to agree to 
including environment in the agenda as part of an overall understanding on a set of 
negotiations that meet their own objectives,e.g., regarding restricting developed countries 
subsidies in energy,fisheries,or agriculture which may have adverse effects on the 
environment;and/or provision of assistance to developing countries to help them address 
poverty issues that contribute to environmental degradation. However, it may be said that 
member nations should domestically exercise their right to set appropriate standards for 
health,safety, environment and biodiversity. Chimni(2000) acknowledges that developing 
countries have to pursue an independent and self reliant path of sustainable development. 
However he notes that "environmental measures addressing transboundary or global 
environmental problems should as far as possible be based on international consensus. 
The cooperative approach represents an integrated response based on the principle of 
common, but differential responsibility. "The legal form that the cooperative solution 
should assume is a matter of debate. Its goals could be achieved either through separate 
multilateral trade agreements or as side agreement in WTO or through innovation in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
So, in the broad sense the conclusion that emerges  is to  delink Labor and 
Environmental Standards from trade matters; shift to Appropriate Governance and 
possibly discuss trade issues which have "necessary interface" with environment. 
 
2. Competition Policy and  Services Standards 
Yet another new issue is competition policy and services standards,We discuss 
competition policies in the first section while the services standards is discussed in the 
next section.. 
2.1 Competition policies: 
 National competition law can be defined as the set of rules and disciplines maintained by 
governments relating either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to 
the abuse of dominant position(including attempts to create a dominant position through 
merger).Competition policy has a much broader domain.It comprises the set of measures 
and instruments used by governments that determine the “condition of competition” that 
reign on the markets.Anti-trust or competition law  is a component of competition 
policies.Other components can include actions to privatize state owned 
enterprises,deregulate activities,cut firm-specific subsidy programs and reduce the extent 
of policies that discriminate against foreign products or producers.A key distinction 
between competition law and competition policy is that the latter pertains to both private 
and governmental actions,whereas anti-trust pertains to behavior of private 
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entities(firms).Many dimensions of competition policy are already on the WTO agenda-
e.g.,trade policy, subsidies ,intellectual property protection,market access in services.The 
focus of the debate in the WTO is therefore on whether there should be specific rules 
pertaining to national competition law and its enforcement. 
         Competition policy seeks to prevent predatory pricing and monopolization of 
markets.It should provide guaranteed access to national courts without discrimination 
between domestic and foreign firms,enact basic standards of enforcement's such as 
transparency of proceedings,the applications of sanctions and an effective competing 
authority.It is clearly in the interest of developing countries to have a modern competition 
policy8,particularly regarding the possibility of substituting AD and CVD measures with 
competition policies. 
.In the context of the TRIPs agreement competition policy coupled with compulsory 
licensing offers one avenue for mitigating some of the most egregious effects of TRIPs 
agreement(Mathur,2001). More fundamental domestic reasons, such as concentration of 
production in several sectors sometimes associated with the entry of foreign 
investors,also dictate the adoption of a new domestic competition policy. 
           Developing countries tend to be attracted by the idea of cooperation to deal with 
abuses by multinational companies, a theme they have pursued for many years in the 
context of the United Nations.Some(notably Hong-Kong) argue that mutually consistent 
trade and competition policies,including the incorporation of additional competition  
concepts into the WTO system,could reduce the need for governmental trade measures 
that discriminate against competitive suppliers,and in particular for anti-dumping 
actions.However,the prospects of this happening in the near future are dim given the 
opposition of the United States and the European Union. 
          Developing countries may  like to support the development of multilateral case for 
competition policy,particularly to tackle the possibility of negative spillovers across 
markets.This is done by cooperation among all to ensure that the outcome maximizes 
global welfare. Several examples of potential interest to developing countries can be 
found. Excessively high levels of IP protection can inhibit transfer of technology. Foreign 
export cartels may charge excessively high prices.In the shipping market, international 
cartelization inflicts terms of trade losses for some developing countries, particularly 
India.In all these cases ,although domestic competition policy could attempt to redress the 
anti-competitive impact,it may be relatively ineffective because of the jurisdictional 
problems or because remedial measures(for example,refusing foreign IPR owners or 
foreign suppliers of essential products access to domestic markets) may not be  
credible.Enforcement can be more effective when taken at source,involving the 
cooperation of partner countries. However,it may be apt to say that multilateral rules on 
competition policies are likely to be very general and probably not very ambitious. 
Competition policy standards, practices and institutions are divergent enough between 
industrial countries as to militate against very detailed and specific multilateral rule 
making.On balance,it would seem that the most substantial gains for India would arise 
from the creation of an effective domestic competition policy. Multilateral rules on 
competition policy are likely to provide net benefits,albeit small in magnitude, especially 
if the prospects of addressing the menace of anti-dumping are slim. 
 
                                                
8 See Bhattacharjea,"Trade and Competition Policy in a Developing Country Context,"(1999) 
 12 
Traditionally, competition policy was a matter that pitted the developing against the 
developed countries, since the former wanted to proscribe what they considered anti-
developmental private practices of corporations (e.g. export-restricting clauses) whereas 
the latter typically opposed the raising of such matters as “anti-business” radicalism. 
Today, the issue has become one of contention among developed countries themselves: 
principally, the US has been keen to object to private practices in Japan (such as 
keiretsus, restrictions on the opening of large-scale retail stores etc.) that are taken to 
reduce market access; and the developing countries are more or less on the sidelines. 
  
Merit Janow’s(1999) underlines, the differences that have emerged, that make (for many) 
the full-throated inclusion of competition policy on the future multilateral trade rounds 
premature. The case for such inclusion is best made in Frederick Jenny’s paper(1999) 
which conveys, without necessarily sharing the EC viewpoint, mainly advocated by Sir 
Leon Brittan. In contrast, Joel Klein presents the opposite viewpoint of the US Justice 
Department, as currently constituted, which would like to keep anti-trust matters out of 
what is considered an impure, negotiations-and-compromise- 
infested trade arena. Eleanor Fox(1999), on the other hand, seeks to provide a 
middle ground, arguing how a “minimalist” agenda could be devised whose narrowly-
focused objective would be to enhance trade-related competition and hence to add to the 
efficiency of the trade liberalization that WTO seeks to advance. Litan(1999) speaks to 
similar concerns. 
 
An interesting issue is the widespread desire in Washington, dictated by intense lobbying 
from import-competing business and allied legal lobbies, that anti-dumping be kept out of 
competition Policy discussions, even though many saw a competition policy accord as 
enabling the purging of the absurdly protectionist anti-dumping rules from world trade. 
Thus, in this view, the focus should be entirely on market access, not on import 
competition, from any one country’s viewpoint. But that is surely not a coherent position; 
but this is not the first time that coherence and intellectual consistency have been 
sacrificed to lobbying interests! 
Given these strongly divergent viewpoints, and the differences that divide the two 
principal negotiators, the EU and the US, the majority opinion on Competition 
Policy is that the matter was important but should not be 
part of the “first-track” of matters that could be negotiated more readily but 
belonged to the “second-track” where Committees could be set up, or continued, to 
explore the matter in depth, both intellectually and among bureaucrats.As far as 
developing countries are concerned  there is a  strong need for a modern 
competition policies for each nation state.However,multilateral  disciplines on 
competition policies are likely to provide net benefits,albeit small in 
magnitude,especially if the prospects of addressing the menace of anti-dumping are 
slim.Preferably,such disciplines should include outlawing practices that involves 
negative spillovers such as export cartels(as in shipping) and bringing anti-dumping 
duties within its ambit. 
2.2.Services Standards: 
   Effective market access for both goods and services requires the elimination not only of 
explicit restrictions but also of the implicit barriers created by standards and other 
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domestic regulations. In goods, environmental standards and safety standards (for certain 
types of apparel) have both impacted on Indian exports.In services,trade restrictive 
effects have arisen from a variety of qualification and licensing requirements in 
professional and numerous other services.9Mattoo and Subramaniam(2000) suggests 
three international routes to dealing with such barriers:harmonization of national 
regulations(leading possibly to the creation of international standards);mutual 
recognition(MR),(Krueger,1999 also recommends this route),and strengthening 
multilateral disciplines on national standards.However,with respect to the first proposal, 
Bhagwati and Hudec(1996) note that in both goods and services where countries have 
varying preferences for quality,including in relation to safety and the environment 
,harmonization is probably not desirable.Environmental diversity among countries is 
perfectly legitimate.It can arise not merely because the environment is differently valued 
in the sense that the utility function defined for consumption and pollution abatement is 
not identical and homothetic but also  because of differences in endowments and 
technology across countries.In fact even with homothetic preferences,income matters:At 
the same cost of abatement relative to consumption,a country with ten times the income 
of another will spend ten times as much on abatement.Forcing the poor country to spend 
as much on abatement will reduce its welfare substantially.Hence the common 
presumption driving demands to harmonize standards or (alternatively) to countervail the 
'social dumping' consequences of labor standards-that is  the assumption that others with 
different cross country intraindustry hamonization standards are illegitimately and 
unfairly reducing their costs(those firms who work under lower labor and environmental 
standards)-is untenable.In the case of services the difficulty of harmonization is revealed 
by the absence of widely accepted international standards.Whereas such standards exist 
as in banking or maritime transport,meeting them is seen as a first step towards 
acceptability rather than as a sufficient condition for market access. With regard to 
mutual recognition agreements in case of technical standards it should not be seen as a 
discriminatory device by the members states. Strengthening multilateral disciplines on 
standards can be an important strategy for addressing barriers through imposition of 
technical standards. In this regard the question of whether trade policy is the best 
instrument to address environmental and labour standards needs to be deeply scrutinized. 
      An important strategy for addressing barriers is to strengthen multilateral disciplines 
on standards.This can be done by supplementing the NT principle with the "necessity 
test"(Mattoo and Subramaniam,2000).The test is already part of the UR agreement for 
goods and the recently established disciplines in the accountancy sector.For instance,in 
the case of professionals like doctor, a requirement to requalify would be judged 
unnecessary,since the basic problem,inadequate information about whether they possess 
the required skills could be remedied by a less burdensome test of competence.This test 
could also be applied to situations where a country is contemplating trade restrictive 
measures on the grounds that environmental or labour standards in a partner countries are 
too "low".The necessity test would not seek to deny a county's right to be concerned 
                                                
9 The requirement of registration with or membership of professional organizations can also constitute an obstacle for a 
person wishing to provide the service on a temporary basis. For instance, in the United States requirements to practice 
medicine for foreign-qualified doctors vary from stat e to state. Candidates must also pass the qualifying examination of 
the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates and then undergo a period of graduate medical education 
at a hospital in the United States. 
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about environmental and labour problems in other countries,but subject the instruments it 
chooses to critical scrutiny.It would seem desirable to use the test to create a presumption 
in favor of economically efficient choice of policy in remedying market failure and in 
pursuing non-economic objectives Finally,India must upgrade its standards and related 
institutions consistent with domestic preferences for quality. This would strengthen the 
case for obtaining foreign recognition and also allow foreign technical barriers to be 
credibly challenged. 
 In summary strengthen disciplines on MRAs to ensure that they are non-
discriminatory.Push for multilateral disciplines on domestic regulations in goods 
and services based on necessity test.Improve domestic standards. 
 
3. Multilateral Agreement on Investment(MAI) inclusion in WTO versus Voluntary 
Codes at OECD and elsewhere: 
        The strongest analytical case for multilateral rules on FDI stems from the 
proliferation of investment incentives which creates policy induced distortions in FDI 
flows without augmenting their aggegate size.Given the widespread use of these 
incentives by industrial and developing countries(not just as federal but also at sub-
federal levels),the prospects for disciplining them are likely to be slim.Thus if multilateral 
discipline on investment incentives are ruled out a case can be created for multilateral 
agreement on investment.The issue is whether multilateral rules on investments are 
necessary and desirable or whether FDI regimes should be determined unilaterally.It is 
puzzling as to why the case for multilateral rules on FDI is different from that of 
conventional trade policy or for trade in services which after all involves opening markets 
to FDI.However,it is possible to subsume the investment policies within the ambit of 
competition policies by strengthening competition policies.For example,such policies can 
prevent the acquisition and abuse of market power by,and regulate other competitive anti-
competitive practices of,foreign(and domestic) firms.The interesting question then is 
whether there is need for additional discretion to regulate FDI.One example would seem 
to be measures designed to ensure the transfer of technology and training of local 
workers.Therefore ,the countries need to examine case for preserving discretion beyond 
that provided by strengthened competition policy. 
 
The discussion of MAI, the  new issue is being considered for the future multilateral 
trading rounds, was introduced by Donald Johnston, Secretary General of OECD, Rubens 
Ricupero Secretary General of UNCTAD, Richard Eglin of WTO and Ambassador 
Narayanan of India. Ricupero and Narayanan paper  are skeptical of the idea of including 
MAI in the WTO. 
 
Johnston paper(1999) emphasized, in light of the NGOs’ success in derailing MAI at the 
OECD, that the matter of including an Investment agreement in the WTO would prove to 
be highly contentious. Eglin(1999) argues that we ought to work towards a minimalist 
agenda so that a multilateral set of rules could be agreed upon at the WTO, since that 
would bring discipline to the huge investment flows today. The discussion generally 
seemed to bring forth arguments against including MAI of any sort into the future 
multilateral trading Round agenda, some of the principal arguments being: 
(i) NGOs would create a lot of disruption, as with OECD’s MAI, with 
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unfortunate negative spillovers into the Round’s other agendas; 
(ii) While foreign investment certainly has an essential relationship to 
trade when the “right to establish” is involved in getting proper access 
to foreign markets, and the proscription of export performance 
requirements and local content rules under Trade Related Investment Measures(TRIMs) 
may be seen as  simply reiterating implicit such proscriptions against “trade-distorting” 
policies in the general text of GATT as regards domestic (and indeed 
all) investment, the huge numbers of proscriptions of host-country 
policies in favor of foreign investors that can be found in the text of 
MAI as drafted at the OECD simply do not carry such credibility. 
Thus, does it really make sense to include in a mandatory agreement at 
the WTO proscriptions on requirements to hire nationals? This is, 
after all, a "gray matter" area where there can be room for legitimate 
differences of opinion among economists as to its advisability in terms 
of national welfare maximization. Besides, MAI, in this sort of 
overreach, also cannot but be seen as invading gratuitously the 
sovereignty of nations to make their own choices, even if these might 
be mistakes: which is precisely why the NGOs around the world have 
agitated against it. 
(iii) Given the political opposition to having an MAI at the WTO, and the 
weak economic case for it as well, would it not be wise to shelve the matter 
from the future multilateral trade rounds, especially as countries around the world have 
been opening their doors wide to foreign investment anyway and the 
need to do anything dramatic to encourage direct investment flows is 
far from compelling? 
 
Thus, the OECD Code, the MAI, can be a voluntary code; if a country does not like it, it 
can choose not to join (unlike putting it into the WTO today). Then again, other such 
Codes can also be developed, e.g. by UNCTAD. Thus, the OECD Code has more on 
corporate rights and little on corporate obligations and host-country rights; the UNCTAD 
Code can be the other way around. Let the countries decide which they wish to sign up 
for. 
Hence, there seems to be a fair amount of sympathy that this new issue be kept out 
of the WTO, and therefore out of the Millennium Round agenda. And that we ought 
instead to pursue the matter through Voluntary Codes.Alternatively, countries can 
be willing to discuss multilateral disciplines but examine case for preserving 
discretion beyond that provided by strengthened competition policy.Also,there is 
potential for member countries to cover various aspects of foreign investment in the 
voluntary commitments of GATS.Therefore,there is undoubtedly need for more 
research in this area and particularly on whether other safeguards need to be built 
into an investment agreement to preserve the freedom to pursue national objectives. 
 
4.Electronic Commerce: Electronic Commerce10 accounts for a small but rapidly 
growing proportion of world trade in goods and services. This growth has occurred in 
                                                
10 There is no single definition of electronic commerce.The widest definition would include transactions where any one 
or more of the following three stages are carried out by electronic means:the pre-purchase stage including advertising 
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legal vacuum with few accepted rules and disciplines. Moreover, the cross border nature 
of transactions has made the issue of legal jurisdiction unclear. There is little doubt that 
over time, a framework of global rules for transactions through the internet will have to 
be established. The key issue is whether there is enough understanding of the issues and 
enough international consensus to attempt to reach an agreement as part of a new round 
of WTO negotiations. 
              This topic was first discussed in 1998 at the WTO, particularly in the context of 
the US proposal of permanently not imposing any custom duties on all electronic 
delivered products11.Many developing countries were put off by the proposal  at the time 
as it was felt that it had not been sufficiently explored and discussed. In subsequent 
discussions, developing countries raised a variety of concerns: Some thought that such a 
commitment will result in countries foregoing future opportunities to collect custom 
revenue12;others were concerned as to whether the electronic mode of service supply 
should be given preferential status relative to other modes which were being regulated. 
Others raised the question whether certain  electronically delivered product should be 
classified as services or goods like the contents of book, audio CDs, films, computer 
software, etc. These products, when delivered on physical media, have all along being 
classified as goods and charged to custom duty or exempted from it depending on the 
prevalent tariff at national borders of respective member countries. However, these 
products are now capable of being digitalized and transmitted through internet. The 
debate is on the classification of digitialized products such as music, books, software, etc 
-whether these can be classified as goods or services and whether GATT or GATS 
principle will apply. The other uncertainties are a) how to ensure privacy of transactions 
and how to value encrypted data;b)what are the links to TRIPs e.g., copyright protection 
for electronic and database material;c)And finally,there are many standards related issues 
involving interconnection and interoperability of systems which need to be addressed to 
ensure that standards setting by governments does not impede electronic 
commerce(WTO,1999 )  
      
         The initial inhibitions regarding loss of tariff revenues are clearly an exaggeration-
after all most countries provide large scale exemption to their existing tariff 
schedules.Mattoo and Schuknecht(1999) estimated the tariff revenue countries collected 
from these products13.Even if all delivery of digitiable media products moved online-an 
                                                                                                                                            
and information seeking;the purchase stage including ordering and payment;and the delivery stage.The WTO decision 
concerns only electronically delivered products. 
 
11 In principle,all types of products can be advertised and purchased over electronic networks, the potential for 
electronic delivery, and the scope of the WTO decision not to impose duties is more limited.It requires that a final 
product be presented as digitilazed information and transmitted electronically, typically over the  Internet. The bulk of 
the products that can be supplied in this manner are services legal customized software,etc. Some information and 
entertainment products typically characterized as goods, such as books, standardized software,music and videos 
embody digitalized information that can also be supplied electronically over the Internet. 
12With respect to the proposal- imposing no duties on electronically delivered goods,India has drifted from its earlier 
position to the one which supports the proposal ,probably due to the growing importance of software exports. India has 
now joined the many countries that are in support of the existing duty free treatment for electronic commerce to be 
made legally binding. 
13 In this study the assumption was that  services are not subject to custom duties.Therefore,the study looked at the 
fiscal implications if international trade in digitialized products currently classified as goods shifts to internet,and if no 
tariffs are levied on such products.The estimates were reasonably reliable for the most important categories where trade 
and tariff data were available for the most important countries. 
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unlikely prospect-the revenue loss would be minimal. India would lose 0.4% of tariff 
revenue and 0.1% of total revenue. Since the bulk of such commerce concerns  services, 
the relevant regime is that established by the GATS regime on cross border trade. This 
Agreement allows countries to decide whether to commit to market access,i.e., not to 
impose quotas, and to national treatment, i.e., not to discriminate in any way against 
foreign services and suppliers. If a country has already made such a commitment, then 
any further promise not to impose duties is superfluous because custom duties inherently 
discriminate against foreign services. If a country has not made such a commitment, then 
the promise not to impose custom duties is worth little, because a country remains free to 
impede access through discriminatory internal taxation. Worse they may take recourse to 
quotas which are ironically still permissible in spite of being economically inferior 
instruments. Hence, the focus on duty-free treatment is misplaced. The objective for 
countries like India should rather be to push trading partners into making deeper and 
wider commitments under the GATS on cross border trade regarding market access and 
national treatment14. 
                   The sheer pervasiveness of the Internet makes it impossible for even the best-
intentioned regulators to keep out. Such issues as privacy, consumer protection, 
intellectual property rights, contracts and taxation cannot be left entirely to self-regulation 
if e-commerce is to flourish. Also, in case of electronic commerce antitrust action may be 
more important online than off line. Satapathy (2000) notes that some of the areas where 
the government can play a regulatory role are the following:- 
1.Provision of a legal and regulatory framework to facilitate e-commerce by recognition 
of electronic records and providing for certification of digital signatures rules of 
encryption and secure electronic transmission. 
2.Protection of copyright and other intellectual property rights. 
3.Data  protection and protection of privacy of individuals and corporate entities. 
4.Consumer protection 
5.Prevention of cyber frauds in electronic money transactions, including money 
laundering. 
6.Other regulatory issues relating to public morality (e.g.,child pornography) and 
criminality(e.g., facilitating sale of narcotic drugs, assisting terrorists, etc). 
 
            WTO members currently have decided that electronic delivery of products will 
continue to be free from custom duties. For the moment this commitment is temporary 
and political, but there are proposals to make it durable and legally binding. Two aspects 
of the commitment are notable. First, only electronic transmissions are covered; goods 
ordered through electronic means but imported through normal channels are explictly 
excluded. Secondly the standstill/prohibition applies only to custom duties; there is no 
mention of other forms of restrictions. 
5.Government Procurement: There are many good reasons to liberalize government 
procurement. Some benefits are analogous to those arising from the liberalization of 
                                                
14 Mattoo and Subramaniam(2000) have summarized the current state of commitments on cross-border supply in some 
of the areas in which developing countries have an export interest.In software implementation and data processing,of 
the total WTO Membership of over 130,only 56 and 54 members,respectively,have made commitments;and only half 
of these commitments guarantee unrestricted market access,and similar proportion guarantee unqualified treatment.In 
all professional services,there are commitments from 74 members,but less than a fifth assure unrestricted market access 
and national treatment,respectively.There clearly remains scope for widening and deepening commitments. 
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trade,but to these must be added the budgetary benefits of efficient procurement and 
significant reductions in rent seeking which is rampant in procurement. Thus, both the 
consumer and the taxpayer will benefit. But WTO experience shows that most 
countries(developed and developing) are reluctant to immediately accept full 
liberalization of procurement. 
                 For India, Srivastava (1999) estimates that the total value of purchases by the 
central and state governments and public enterprises, which could in principle be subject 
to international government procurement rules, varies between 3.4 and 5.7% of GDP. For 
certain procurement contracts, a price preference of 15% is given to indigenous 
equipment suppliers, requiring that atleast 20% value must be added in India. In the 
shipping sector, price preferences up to 30% apply to Indian bidders on procurement 
contracts .If more efficient procurement practices can be implemented domestically, 
Srivastava (1999) calculates that the total saving could be as much as 1.7% of GDP or 
about US $ 8 billion. Even if only a fraction of the estimated savings is realized, the gain 
can be substantial. 
             One of the biggest problems in procurement is moral hazard (the tendency of the 
procurer to aggravate risks) on the part of procurer. The significant benefit of a 
multilateral agreement is in helping to overcome national agency problems in 
procurement by creating mechanisms for reciprocal international monitoring supported 
by multilateral enforcement. It achieves this by shifting the legal scope for monitoring 
from dispersed taxpayers who may have little interest in monitoring individual 
procurement decisions to the bidders for contracts who have a significant stake. Two 
elements of a possible multilateral agreement are crucial in this context. First, the  agency 
problem is mitigated by creating obligations on the procurer to be transparent. Secondly, 
foreign suppliers are given the opportunity to challenge the decisions of the procurer 
before national courts or independent and impartial review bodies. As a starting point the 
countries may like to increase transparency and strengthen enforcement15.Alternatively, it 
has also been suggested that countries could continue to maintain preference margins, but 
agree to bind them and make them subject to unilateral or negotiated reductions. In 
addition to improved domestic policy, government procurement offers the potential for 
making negotiating linkages. Foreign suppliers can only effectively contest the market for 
government procurement if they are not unduly handicapped by restrictive trade 
measures. Hence, the creation of genuine international competition for procurement 
contracts depends crucially on the liberalization of trade. It would, therefore, be natural 
for developing countries to make willingness to accept disciplines on government 
procurement depend on future negotiations on market access for goods and under the 
GATS on measures affecting trade in services16.For instance,one of the most important 
services sectors in the context of government procurement is construction.Yet in the 
GATS,members have usually not bound themselves to grant market access to the supply 
of construction services through the presence of natural persons,except for certain limited 
categories of intr-corporate transferees.The assurance that workers can be temporarily 
                                                
15 A recent paper (Evennett and Hoekman,1999),however,suggests that it is important to eliminate preferences in 
government procurement before improved competitive practices are put in place.This is because,if the opposite 
sequence is followed,under certain circumstances,preferences on government procurement could lead to increased 
misallocation. 
16 As most government purchases relate to services rather than merchandise trade, the issues have  to essentially with 
liberalization and national treatment of foreign service providers. 
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moved to construction sites would greatly increase the benefit of non-discriminatory 
government procurement for developing countries.The same apllies to procurement of 
other services such as software and transport. 
 
Section II: 
The Traditional, “Core” Issues 
That leaves us with the Old, the Traditional, the “Core” Issues of GATT: the continued 
freeing of trade barriers,  the fixing of the dispute settlement mechanism , reducing 
quantitative restrictions and subsidies,credit for unilateral liberalization,agriculture 
liberalization across  countries,avoiding sectoral approach to negotiations, increasing 
coherence among multilateral institutions,trade related investment measures  and product 
standards. 
2.1.Freeing Trade: The two important papers by Patrick Low,1999 (jointly authored) 
and by Arvind Panagariya(1999) amply show that there was much freeing of trade still to 
be done.And, most important, the idea put out by Fred Bergsten in Foreign Affairs some 
time ago that the rich countries had few barriers to reduce and hence must now offer 
“rules” changes against the poor countries’ trade barrier reduction offers, was simply 
wrong. The rich countries had peaks in industrial tariffs and, after agricultural 
tariffication, had substantial trade tariffs in agriculture to negotiate down as well. 
Besides, there is much freeing of both border and internal barriers to trade in services left 
to be negotiated. 
 So,even without the new issues, there could well be substantial opportunities for 
tradeoffs in tariff reductions among and within the poor and the rich nations. The 
old GATT agenda of trade barrier reductions was still important. 
2.2.Fixing the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Besides, there was enough work to be 
done on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, as illustrated by the highly publicized cases 
such as the Bananas Dispute and the Hormone-fed Beef dispute between the EU and the 
United States, and by the Shrimp-Turtle decisions. These matters were the subject of 
important papers by: Professors Hudec(1999), Jackson(1999), Iwasawa(1999) and 
Cottier(1999).Bhagawati(1999) challenges the rationale of the methods of 
“compensation” that the WTO allows successful plaintiffs to impose; Gary Horlick(1999) 
discusses the hormone-beef type disputes that bring in consumer groups’ objections. 
 
2.3.Forming coalitions on issue of agriculture:Bringing agriculture under WTO 
disciplines was a significant achievement.Not only were any further increases in 
subsidies and agricultural protection among the developed countries ruled out,but there 
was some relatively minor  rollback(with a commitment to a 20% reduction in the 
total(distorting) support provided by government to agriculture and a cutback in export 
subsidies) and the commitment to shift to tarrification was highly significant. 
      In terms of their immediate interest,the developing countries can be divided into three 
groups.First,there is the group of major exporters of agricultural commodities (Argentina 
,Thailand) which are  members of the Cairns Group17.These countries position is a) 
early,total elimination and prohibition of export subsidies which tend to undermine the 
competitive position of efficient developing country producers; and in the same 
                                                
17 Cairns group-Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Canada,Chile,Colombia,Fiji, Indonesia,Malaysia,New 
Zealand,Paraguay,Phillippines,South Africa,Thailand and Uruguay. 
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connection,seek to regulate the provision of export credits;b)deep cuts in tariffs,removal 
of non-tariff barriers,increase in trade volume under tariff-quotas so to enhance market 
access prospects;c)elimination of trade distorting domestic support 
measures(WTO,1998).At the same time they need to safeguard those aspects of the 
Agreement on Agriculture(as well as add new ones,if appropriate) which permit them to 
extend assistance of various types to poor farmers as well as maintain programs of 
assistance and food security to the poor.But these measures should not introduce 
distortions between selling to domestic market and abroad or between sectors.India 
should try to align itself with the Cairns Group consistent with  forming coalitions based 
on liberalizing ideology.The combination of a relatively unprotected domestic regime and 
potential comparative advantage means that India has real interest in seeking to eliminate 
protection in international agricultural markets.India's sugar and dairy exporters have 
already expressed a serious interest in reducing barrier to their exports.As in 
manufacturing,India also suffers from the preference granted to competing suppliers in 
sectors such as sugar.It is therefore has a real interest in reducing agricultural tariffs. 
                   Second,there is a large group,consisting of the net food importing developing 
countries and others with a significant agricultural sector which produce but also import 
food and export various agricultural products.Past policies in many of these countries 
tended to penalize rather than support the agricultural sector.Two kinds of concern have 
been raised by several of these countries.First,while supporting reductions in export 
subsidies and trade distorting domestic supports in developed countries,the limits to 
aggregate support and export subsidies contained in the agreement(and their possible 
further tightening in the new negotiations),would limit their capacity to increase  support 
to the agricultural sector should they in the future decide to do so.18Second,that although 
reduction in export subsidies by developed countries will be beneficial to their own 
domestic agricultural production,the resulting increase in prices of foodstuffs would 
increase foreign exchange outlays for poor and net food importing  countries which they 
can ill afford19.There is also a third group with small non diversified agricultural 
sectors,either because of climatic conditions or land constraints(e.g. small island 
economies),which are not likely to be significant participants in these discussions. 
   While the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture focussed on distortions primarily 
introduced to agricultural trade by developed country practices,it contains provisions 
which permit developing countries to increase support to agriculture(and to poor 
consumers) through means not available to developed countries.20For example,direct and 
indirect investment and input subsidies to poor farmers are excluded from the calculation 
of aggregate measures (AMS)21; reduction in support commitments by developing 
                                                
18 Some also point to the "unfairness" of the agricultural agreement as it still permits greater support levels for 
developed countries--which had in the past given a great deal of assistance to their agricultural sector-as opposed to the 
developing countries which penalized agriculture in the base period(Das,1998) 
19 There is little evidence that the export subsidy reductions of the Uruguay Round agreements have led to an increase 
in import expenditures of poor net food importing developing countries.Even so,it is legitimate to ask what might 
happen in the future and what is the proper international response to such a potential problem. 
20 It should be recalled however,as part of Uruguay Round agreement and previous negotiations,there were significant  
reductions in tariffs on horticulture and floriculture products of interest to developing countries. 
21 AMS calculations in India are made in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.There are certainly methodological issues in computing AMS that need to be cleared up in subsequent 
negotiations.The AMS methodology is based on differences between the external reference price and domestic 
administrative price,multiplied by the quantity of production eligible for support.There is however,no explicit 
recognition of domestic inflation or currency depreciation. 
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countries can take ten years to be implemented while least developed countries are totally 
exempt;food subsidies to urban and rural poor are excluded from the calculation of 
support,etc. 
       It can be argued however,that the exception of the investment and input subsidies 
provided to poor rural households from the calculation of the AMS is subject to the 
"peace clause"-Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture and thereby limited to the 
1992 levels of support(Kwa and Bello,1998).This may indeed result in unreasonable 
restraints for low income developing countries which may wish overtime to increase their 
support for the rural poor.To eliminate this ambiguity,such subsidies could be included in 
the "Green Box" of measures which are permitted under all circumstances22.But on the 
whole,and with the possible exceptions noted above,it is difficult to visualize 
circumstances where the Agreement seriously constrain developing countries efforts to 
pursue policies that would efficiently promote their agricultural sector. 
  The recently negotiated Food Aid Convention (International Grains Council,1999) 
stipulates that,when allocating food aid,priority should be given to LDCs and low income 
countries.Other net food importing developing countries can also be provided with food 
aid "when experiencing food emergencies or international recognized financial crisis 
leading to food shortage emergencies or when food aid operations are targeted on 
vulnerable groups".But there is nothing and there should be nothing automatic about the 
assistance provided.Indeed,if a need can be shown to exist,the international response 
should not be limited to food aid but extend to all kinds of general purpose financing on 
appropriate terms.The latter would be better than food aid,which is frequently tied to 
procurement from a particular donor and determined by food stock availability in the 
donor rather than the needs of the recipient. 
    Another area of interest to developing countries that are agricultural exporters concerns 
import access rights.Until the Uruguay Round(UR),there was no provision for 
access.Under the UR,all countries were immediately obliged to insure up to 5% market 
access for imports.Increasing minimum access under tariff-quotas,and setting a ceiling on 
the maximum rate of tariff or tariff equivalent would be in the interest of most exporting 
countries. 
   Developing countries that export any agricultural commodities have an interest in 
assuring that phytosanitary regulations are based on scientific evidence.As 
such,developing countries have a strong interest in participating in discussions of 
experience under the UR to insure that changes in regulations enable the improved 
functioning of the system and do not permit the manipulation of phytosanitary standards 
for protectionist ends.PSP regulations that have been negotiated call for mutual 
recognition,which is strongly in the interests of developing countries.If there are 
difficulties,they probably lie in the willingness of developed countries to send delegations 
to attest to the testing procedures in developing countries. 
   In recent years, a number of countries have been interested in protecting claims of 
geographic origin of particular commodities. The issue has arisen in several cases with 
regard to developing countries:a prominent example is basmati rice which has been 
mentioned as the name of a special rice that should be labeled only if originating in South 
Asia.While there are a few agricultural commodities where the rights to claiming names 
                                                
22 An alternative would be to exempt from challenges under the subsidies agreement.Also,there can be possibility that 
members states artificially transfer subsidies to the green box to show lower levels of AMS.  
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and geographic origin may be of interest to developing countries,in general the 
developing countries interest lie on the other side of the issue.Rights to particular names 
and geographic origin designations are generally restrictive and tend to increase the 
difficulty of entry into a market.As developing countries are generally potential late 
entrants into markets,efforts to restrict the use of particular names is generally not in their 
interest,and is an issue which developing countries should negotiate with care. 
   The above discussion yields that developing countries need to form coalitions on varied 
issues and make sure that these issues are discussed in length at the ongoing tranche of  
WTO agricultural negotiations. 
2.4.Subsidies:Export subsidies23 are forbidden while the issue of providing subsidy to 
production24 has been dealt by defining three classes of subsidy,classes that are 
sometimes conveniently identified by the colors of a traffic light(Deardorff,1996).They 
include "Red light subsidies" whose redeeming values cannot be identified,and these are 
simply prohibited.They include export subsidies,as already mentioned,subsidies that are 
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods,plus an illustrative list of very 
explicit subsidies that fall into this category."Yellow light subsidies" on the other 
hand,are not prohibited at all,but their possible adverse effects on other countries 
producers are nonetheless recognized by permitting importers to levy countervailing 
duties against them under specified circumstances.They are called "actionable 
subsidies".Finally "Green light subsidies" are "non actionable subsidies" and include both 
subsidies that are not specific to particular firms or industries,plus certain subsidies for 
research and development,regional development, and adaption to environment 
regulations. 
    Although the deadline for developed countries to phase out prohibited subsidies has 
passed,least developed countries and countries with per capita GNP below $1000 may 
maintain export subsidies indefinitely,and all other developing countries have until 
January 2003 to remove them,with possibility of extension in particular cases if this is 
found justified by economic, financial or development needs. Countries in transition to a 
market economy must phase out prohibited subsidies by January 2002;until then,they also 
enjoy some immunity from countervailing measures against their actionable subsidies. 
    The subsidy agreement figures in the WTO built-in agenda: Two important rules in the 
agreement apply only provisionally and must be reviewed.One, the presumption that 
certain subsidies such as those which amount to more than 5 % of the value of the 
product or are given to cover an industry's operating losses tend to give rise to adverse 
trade effects in developed countries and not in developing countries. A second review is 
to decide whether the permitted ("green") category of subsidies should continue to 
exist.Further, any experience gained of the export competitiveness by developing 
countries due to such subsidies should not lead to gain of more than 3.25% of the world 
                                                
23 In the Uruguay Round it was decided that export subsidies must be reduced by stipulated percentages on both 
volume(21% for developed countries and 16% for developing countries) and budgetary(36% for developed countries 
and 24% for developing countries) terms.In addition,there is minumum market access commitment of 5%,increasing to 
5% over a period of six years. 
24 On the one hand production subsidies tend to adversely effect producers in another country  and on the other hand 
there exist a multitude of economic reasons why some production subsidies are atleast second best and sometimes even 
first best means of achieving various legitimate objectives. The simplest example in economic terms is the use of a 
subsidy to the production of a good that yields an external economic benefit for other parts of the economy. A more 
common and familiar example is the use of subsidy to promote growth of an infant industry. 
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market is  also under consideration. . The concern is however more with the 
implementation of the agreement than with its rules.  
2.5.Quantitative Restrictions : Quantitative restrictions (QRs) are usually regarded as 
more onerous than tariffs because of the more limited flexibility that they permit in trade 
and because they place greater limits on the extent to which foreign and domestic sellers 
can compete. In addition,it is very difficult to measure the restrictiveness of a 
QR(Deardorff and Stern,1985) and this makes it hard to negotiate only their partial 
liberalization. It is therefore only recently that QRs have come under the discipline of the 
GATT. The WTO, with some exceptions, largely prohibits their use. This includes both 
explicit quotas that are imposed on particular products, and also import licensing schemes 
that allocate foreign exchange in a manner that is discriminatory across goods or 
countries. Voluntary export restraints (VERs) which have taken quantitative form, are 
also prohibited as part of safeguards rules (discussed below). QRs are permitted, even on 
a discriminatory basis for a country which is experiencing severe excess demand for 
foreign exchange that is making it difficult to retain foreign exchange reserves.QRs have 
been used quite commonly in some sectors especially in agriculture and textiles /apparel 
sectors, implementation of this prohibition has required some major changes in policy.In 
agriculture, existing QRs have been replaced by "tariff equivalents additional tariffs that 
are intended to restrict imports to the level of the QR.These tariff equivalents will then be 
subjected to future liberalization through the same process of negotiated tariff binding 
that long has been used for other goods. In the case of textiles and apparel ,on the other 
hand ,the complex web of quotas that has spread over recent decades under the MFA is 
allowed to continue to exist temporarily with WTO members committed to schedule of 
removing them over the next ten years. The schedule for eliminating these quotas leaves 
the bulk of the trade to be liberalized only at the end of this ten year period, and it leaves 
to the discretion of importing countries which product lines they liberalize before 
that.Any bargaining strategy that is developed should be structured in such a way as to 
insure that the unwinding of the MFA and the other undertakings already agreed to in fact 
take place. Developing countries should recognize that it is vital that the Uruguay Round 
undertakings be carried out and it is clearly in their interest to insist upon it25. 
 
2.6.Credit for unilateral liberalization. Developing countries have unilaterally reduced 
their levels of protection.Because it has been outside of multilateral tariff negotiations, 
and because in many instance tariffs have not been bound26,developing countries have 
received no "credit" for these liberalization in the negotiating rounds. In part, this has 
been because countries that have liberalized their regimes have nonetheless been 
reluctant to bind their tariff levels and hence lose right to restore protection should 
circumstances arise that induce them to do so. From the viewpoint of the major trading 
countries, credit cannot be given in this circumstance because of the possibility of 
revocation. A strong case can be made that developing countries should bind tariff 
reductions in their own self interest. It is an effective means of liberalization because 
refusal to bind casts doubt as to the intentions of policy makers to maintain trade 
                                                
25 It will be difficult to get developed countries,especially the US,to negotiate their tariff rates on textiles and 
clothing,which under the agreement on textiles and clothing(ATC) would be the only mechanism of protection of this 
sector(for WTO members) after 2005.EU commissioner Brittan announced in March,1999 that the EU would not 
exclude textiles and clothing from tariff negotiations. 
26 In the Indian tariff regime some of the consumer and industrial products still do not have binding tariff rates.  
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liberalization. Nevertheless, it should be possible to find means to negotiate for some 
credit for liberalization even if tariffs are not bound, provided that provisions could be 
made for reciprocity on the part of developed countries,particularly in insisting for 
reduction in agricultural tariff rates.Because most of the prospective unilateral 
liberalization in the world is in developing countries, and because improved market 
access is greatly in their interest,this is an area where negotiations should be possible and 
to the benefit of the  group as a whole. 
2.7. Avoiding sectoral approach to negotiations:In recent years,developed countries 
have begun to negotiate agreements on issues such as telecom and information 
technology.There are several difficulties with this approach:1)once those sectors are 
liberalized,producers in those areas have a reduced incentive to support import 
liberalization in protected sectors;and 2)developed countries are selecting the sectors for 
negotiation in which they believe(probably correctly in most instances) that they have a 
comparative advantage.The sectors of interest to most developing countries(agricultural 
sector) will be much more difficult to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis because they 
are largely import competing,and the political economy of trade liberalization is such that 
political resistance will be strong unless offset by exporting interests in developed 
countries.Developing countries do not need to choose between a new round and sectoral 
negotiations in agriculture;they can strongly support a new round,and nonetheless enter 
into negotiations with respect to agriculture should there be no decision for a new 
round.The difficulty,however, is that there  is likely to be significantly less agricultural 
sector liberalization than there would be if the negotiations took place as part of an 
overall multilateral trade negotiations. 
2.8.Increasing coherence among multilateral institutions.In the Ministerial meeting in 
Marrakkesh to give formal approval to the Uruguay Round,ministers called for "greater 
coherence" between the IMF,the World Bank,and the WTO.In this,there was clear 
recognition of the linkages between global trade and monetary policies and the ability of 
developing countries to achieve rapid economic growth on sustainable basis.The need for 
greater coherence has been apparent at least since the debt crisis of the 1980's,when 
simple arithmetic showed that heavily indebted developing countries could not service 
their debt and resume growth(a monetary issue) unless their exports grew at a sufficiently 
rapid rate.That rate was well above the rate of growth of world GDP;as such,it was clear 
that should protectionist measures in developed countries increase,efforts of the World 
Bank and IMF to support the necessary measures in developing countries would in any 
event be destined to failure.The same is still true.Healthy growth of world trade cannot 
continue unless the underlying functioning of the international monetary system and of 
international capital flows is sound.Likewise,healthy evolution of the international 
financial system,and of the flow of capital from countries with lower real rates of return 
to those with higher real rates of return cannot persist without an open multilateral trading 
system.It is clearly in the interest of all countries,developed and developing,to attempt to 
achieve greater coherence among themselves. 
2.9.Trade Related Investment Measures:International Commerce is today conducted 
by multinational corporations with substantial investments in many countries and that 
there has long been call for international constraints not only on trade policies but also on 
policies affecting foreign direct investment.As a result,the Uruguay Round included 
negotiations on Trade Related Investment Measures(TRIMs),and the WTO too includes a 
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TRIMs agreement.The TRIMs specifically includes measures employed to 
induce/compel MNCs to meet certain yardsticks of performance.These include local 
equity,licensing and local content requirements and sometimes clauses for foreign 
exchange and export commitments.The TRIMs agreement only prohibits investment 
measures that directly affect trade flows in a manner that violates NT or that violates the 
prohibitions of QRs.Prohibited most clearly are local content and trade balancing 
requirements both of which restrict the trade of an international direct investor. The 
agreement requirement is that all such measures be notified.Developed countries were 
required to eliminate them by January 1,1997.Developing countries,however,have until 1 
January 2000 to do so,and the least -developed countries until 1 January 2002.Moreover, 
developing and the least developed countries may be granted extension of their 
transitional periods if they can demonstrate "particular difficulties" in eliminating 
outstanding TRIMs,and the decision of the WTO 's Goods Council on such requests is to 
take into account the development,financial and trade needs of the member 
concerned.Some 25 developing countries have notified that they may use TRIMs of the 
types covered by the agreement. 
        The TRIMs agreement envisages future negotiations.The TRIMs Agreement 
provides for a review before the end of 1999, in the context of which consideration is to 
be given to whether the Agreement should be complemented by 
provisions on investment and competition policy.When negotiated,this provision was 
widely regarded as establishing an opening for the more substantial negotiations on 
investment desired especially by the United States and also for the negotiations on 
competition issues which some developing countries considered would be necessary as a 
matter of balance.In this context it may be said that liberalization of India's FDI 
regulations will yield substantial benefits27.A new domestic competition policy can 
regulate anti-competitive behavior of foreign(and domestic) firms with additional 
discretion to regulate FDI like measures designed to ensure the  transfer of technology 
and training of local workers28.Also, linkage between domestic environmental policy & 
regulations with multilateral agreement on investment can be worked out while framing 
multilateral rules on investment.In fact some developing countries have made efforts to 
enact investment legislation with environment provisions. An example is the previous 
legislation under the PNDC Law 116 establishing the 1985 Ghana Investment Code. This 
code gave certain powers to Ghana Investment Centre to appraise enterprises likely to 
have an environmental effect, and proposed measures for the prevention, and control of 
such harmful effects to the environment. There is however a need for more research on 
whether other safeguards need to be built into an investment agreement to preserve the 
freedom to pursue national objectives. However, blanket opposition to any investment 
agreement is not easy to comprehend. Krueger(1999) agrees and argues for supporting 
the development of multilateral investment code which can ensure low-cost supply of 
foreign capital to countries, particularly developing countries like India which is hoping 
to attract foreign capital to accelerate their development process.It is in developing 
countries interest to support the development of such a code. However, Hoekman and 
                                                
27 In the case of India,despite considerable liberalization,FDI continues to be regulated and in adhoc manner,imposing 
serious costs(Das,1999) 
28 It is relevant that India has reserved the right to impose these requirements on foreign investment under the GATS,on 
which any investment agreement is likely to be modeled. 
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Saggi(1999) argue that countries need to take cautious stand in this regard.They note that 
a more general agreement is neither needed nor feasible at this stage because there is 
potential for developing countries to cover various aspects of foreign investment in the 
voluntary commitments of GATS. 
2.10.Product Standards:Governments engage in a wide variety of regulatory actions 
many of which are not targeted at international trade but which nonetheless may affect 
the costs or feasibility of trade.There are many regulations,standards and other measures 
that restrict the form that a good may take or a manner in which it may be produced for 
sale in the domestic market.Such rules may be intended to protect the public safety or 
health,or they may only seek to insure compatibility of products that must be used in 
combination.But in either case it is possible for such a rule to be biased against imported 
products,perhaps in the form that a product must take or perhaps in the procedures that 
are laid out for certifying that a rule has been obeyed.The WTO therefore includes its 
own constraints on how such rules should be established and enforced so not to be biased 
against imports.Two sets of constraints appear,one on Technical Regulations and 
Standards and another on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures29,but both have 
essentially the same purpose.They do not prescribe what such regulations should be,only 
that they should be designed and enforced in ways that are do not discriminate against 
imports.Like the agreement on custom valuation these too provide the additional benefit 
of reducing uncertainty in international trade.It is to be noted,however, that GATT 
provisions relating to environment had no explicit provision on the environment but only 
indirect references in Article 20(B) relating to the protection of human,animal or plant 
health and Article 20(G) relating to the conservation of scarce natural 
resources.However,under the Technical Barriers to trade provisions explicit reference 
was made to package labeling or labeling requirements which provide scope for trade 
related environmental barriers(such as eco labels).Environmental protection can also be 
institutionalized under the sanitary and phytosanitary provisions. 
       The Agreement on the application of sanitary measures(SPS) are to be "based on 
scientific principles" and not maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence.."(Article 
2.2).Members are also required to ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary measures(SPMs) 
are based "on an assessment as appropriate to the circumstances,of the risks to 
human,animal or plant life or health,taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organization"(Article 5.1).Finally,members are 
required to ensure that SPMs"do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own 
territory and that of other members" and are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade(Articles 2.3 and 5.5).The SPS 
Agreement favours international standards. Article 3.1 calls on WTO members to base 
measures "on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, 
except otherwise provided in this Agreement." Measures conforming to such 
international standards are "presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement and of GATT 1994"(Article 3.2).The SPS Agreement specifies the source of 
international standards: Codex  Alimentarius as the international source relating to 
food,the international office of  Epizootics relating to animals, and the International Plant 
                                                
29 Phytosanitary measures refer to the health of plants,while sanitary measures evidently refer to health of animals and 
people. 
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Protection Convention relating to plants. Article 3.3 allows members to introduce or 
maintain SPMs which result in a higher level of protection that would be achieved based 
on relevant international standards "if there is scientific justification,or as a consequence 
of the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection a member determines to be 
appropriate pursuant to procedures to assess risks." The agreement on SPS also 
incorporates the Precautionary Principle and permit members "in cases where relevant 
evidence is insufficent" to adopt provisional SPMs on the basis of "available pertinent 
information"(Article 5.7). Finally, it contains a special and differential treatment clause 
.For a discussion of other features of the Agreement on SPS see Barcelo,(1994). 
       The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary Measures (SPS) have raised concerns across countries.As far as 
TBT is concerned many developing countries including India have raised their point that 
they need time, resources and special and differential treatment to develop their own 
capacity to prepare and adopt technical regulations and standards and a in-depth study of 
technical barriers to market access of developing countries suppliers. Croome (1998) 
quotes that "Further challenges to the TBT and SPS agreements will almost certainly 
arise because the measures they regulate are instruments of choice for responding to 
pressures not only from domestic producers seeking protection, but also from 
environmentalist and other non-governmental activists. Packaging and labeling 
requirements, requirements that fishing methods do not harm dolphins or sea turtles, and 
regulations that limit the use of tropical timbers fall within the ambit of the two 
agreements, and are liable to be found contrary to their provisions.Anxiety about the 
strains which high-profile disputes could put on the agreements, and the WTO itself, is 
widespread". Members of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, however, are strong 
supporters of the SPS agreement and in their recent declaration insisted that the SPS 
review should not be used as a pretext to relax present disciplines on the ground of non-
scientific arguments. Their also members states from the developing countries which see 
these agreements as potentially the most sensible means of channeling environmental 
concerns in ways that will not serve protectionist ends by the developed world or put 
strains on the multilateral rules.If agreed standards can be formulated in ISO and other 
international bodies like FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission to take account of 
environmental objectives such as those laid down in multilateral environmental 
agreements, the potential for subsequent difficulties in the WTO could be greatly 
reduced. 
 
                                                       Conclusions  
                It will be better for member nations to focus their attention on the numerous 
'traditional' or old issues in the first instance. However, member countries should not be 
averse to discuss also the new issues like the development of multilateral disciplines in 
competition policies, government procurement, services, domestic regulations in goods 
and services and environmental standards in the future multilateral trade rounds.  
               It is in the interest for the member countries to take an informed stand on the 
WTO issues. Member countries should seriously involve themselves in WTO discussions 
and proceedings to make sure that emerging interpretations and practices concerning 
provisions in the agreement does not result in either an increase in obligations or dilution 
of their rights. Insofar as developing countries can influence the agenda for the next 
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round of multilateral trade round, keeping negotiations cross -sectoral, indicating lack of 
desire to have labor and environmental standards tied to trade issues , insuring that the 
undertakings made in the Uruguay Round (especially with respect to the multi-fibre 
agreement and agriculture) are carried out, and measures that reduce protection in 
developed countries should surely be at the top of the agenda for developing countries. 
Since it is in the developing countries interest that there be a strong and effective WTO 
underpinning the  open multilateral trading system, it will clearly be in the interest to 
support a new round, and to seek outcomes which offer prospects for accelerated growth 
of international trade and their access to each others and developed countries markets. 
Instead of watchfully waiting to support meaningful proposals originating from other 
countries it is time that developing countries should take initiative to evolve and design 
beneficial policies on their own. 
In summary the paper  pinpoints the  agenda for the multilateral trading rounds by 
defining various levels of agenda talks: 
The first track would limit itself to a “core” agenda that would focus on keeping 
negotiations cross sectoral, reduction of non tariff barriers, reductions of 
trade barriers in agriculture, industrial products and services, increasing coherence among 
multilateral institutions in this interdependent world,  and to fixing the dispute settlement 
mechanism to address all recent problems. 
The second track would consist of committees, old and new, that would examine the 
issues raised by (l) the old but important questions, especially PTAs (under article 24 
and the enabling clause) and anti-dumping actions vis-à-vis safeguards ; (2) the new and 
important questions such as competition policy ,electronic commerce and government 
procurement;  3) trade related investment measures; 4)product standards and possibly 
discuss trade issues which have "necessary interface" with environment. 
Finally, and simultaneously, but outside of the WTO and in appropriate agencies, the 
questions raised by civil society to advance social agendas such as better environmental 
policies and reduced violations of human rights (including labor rights) would be 
pursued. So  matters such as MAI can  be left to the development of voluntary, rather 
than mandatory, codes outside the WTO. 
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